Debra S. Retherford v. AT&T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc.; Cathy Bateson; Louise Johnson; Vickie Randall : Brief of Appellee by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1989
Debra S. Retherford v. AT&T Communications of
the Mountain States, Inc.; Cathy Bateson; Louise
Johnson; Vickie Randall : Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard M. Hymas; Nielsen & Senior; Attorney for Respondents.
Richard S. Perkins; Perkins, Schwobe & McLachlan; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Debra S. Retherford v. AT&T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc.; Cathy Bateson; Louise Johnson; Vickie
Randall, No. 890464.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2742
DOCt'M-N'T 
KFU 
45.9 
•S9 
DOCKET NO. 
m ^ 'CaiEF 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEBRA S. RETHERFORD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF THE 
MOUNTAIN STATES, INC.; CATHY 
BATESON; LOUISE JOHNSON; VICKIE 
RANDALL; DOE I through DOE X, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 890464 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Appeal From A Judgment Of The 
Third Judicial District Court 
Of Salt Lake County, State Of Utah 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Richard S. Perkins, Esq. 
Perkins, Schwobe & McLachlan 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 532-6808 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Richard M. Hymas, Esq. 
Nielsen & Senior, P.C. 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellees 
FILE 
JUL 9 WO 
Clerk. Supreme Court, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEBRA S. RETHERFORD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF THE 
MOUNTAIN STATES, INC.; CATHY 
BATESON; LOUISE JOHNSON; VICKIE 
RANDALL; DOE I through DOE X, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No, 890464 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Appeal From A Judgment Of The 
Third Judicial District Court 
Of Salt Lake County, State Of Utah 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Richard M. Hymas, Esq. 
Nielsen & Senior, P.C. 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 532-1900 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Appellees 
Richard S. Perkins, Esq. 
Perkins, Schwobe & McLachlan 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 532-6808 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 7 
ARGUMENT 10 
I THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CREATE A PUBLIC POLICY 
EXCEPTION TO THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE FOR A TERMINATION 
BASED ON ALLEGED SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION AND 
RETALIATION WHERE THE UTAH ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT 
PROVIDES A COMPREHENSIVE AND EXCLUSIVE MECHANISM 
FOR REMEDYING UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION . 10 
II A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN 
VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY SHOULD NOT BE CREATED IN 
THIS CASE WHERE RETHERFORD WAS NOT AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE 
BUT COULD ONLY BE TERMINATED FOR JUST CAUSE AND WHERE 
SHE HAD A REMEDY FOR A TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF 
PUBLIC POLICY 18 
III THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION OF THE UTAH ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION ACT PREEMPTS RETHERFORD'S CLAIMS . . . . 23 
IV RETHERFORD'S CLAIMS AGAINST APPELLEES ARE PREEMPTED 
BY FEDERAL LABOR LAW 27 
A. State Law Contract Claims Are Preempted 
By Federal Labor Law 28 
B. State Law Tort Claims Also Are Preempted 
By Federal Labor Law 29 
- l -
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd) 
P a9 e 
C. Retherford's Claims Against Appellees Are 
Inextricably Intertwined With Consideration 
Of The Terms Of The Collective Bargaining 
Agreement 31 
1. The Wrongful Discharge Claim Against 
AT&T is Preempted by Federal Law . . . . 31 
2. The Breach of Implied Contract Claim 
Against AT&T is Preempted by Federal 
Law 32 
a. The Code of Conduct does not 
constitute an implied contract 
between Retherford and AT&T 32 
b. Retherford's claim for breach of 
implied contract arising out of the 
Code of Conduct is dependent upon 
an analysis of the collective 
bargaining agreement 34 
3. Retherford's Negligent Employment 
Claim is Preempted by Federal Law. . . . 35 
4. Retherford's Claims for Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress and 
Malicious Interference with Contractual 
Relations also are Preempted by Federal 
Law 36 
RETHERFORD'S CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED WHERE SHE 
FAILED TO EXHAUST HER REMEDIES UNDER THE COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENT OR, ALTERNATIVELY, HER CLAIMS 
ARE BARRED BY THE SIX-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. . . 38 
A. Retherford's Claims Are Barred Where She Failed 
To Exhaust Her Contractual Remedies 38 
B. If Retherford's Claims Are Not Barred Because 
She Failed To Exhaust Her Contractual Remedies, 
Her Claims Nevertheless Are Barred By The Six-
Month Statute Of Limitations 39 
-ii-
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd) 
Page 
VI RETHERFORD'S CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENT EMPLOYMENT, BREACH 
OF IMPLIED CONTRACT, AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS 40 
VII RETHERFORD FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THE 
INDIVIDUAL APPELLEES FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION 
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE 
GRANTED 41 
VIII RETHERFORD FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THE 
INDIVIDUAL APPELLEES FOR MALICIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE 
GRANTED 44 
A. Retherford Has Not Alleged Facts Sufficient 
To State A Claim Against The Individual 
Appellees 45 
B. Appellee Bateson-Hough, Who At All Times Was 
AT&T's Manager, Cannot Be Liable For Malicious 
Interference With Contractual Relations As A 
Matter of Law 47 
CONCLUSION 49 
APPENDIX 51 
-iii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
P a9 e 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) 14 
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 
(1985) 27, 28, 29, 30 
Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Co., 608 F.Supp. 1315 
(N.D.Cal. 1984) 16 
Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 583 P.2d 53 (Utah 1978) 17 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 
(Utah 1989) 10, 21, 31, 32 
Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962) . . . 44, 45 
Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 736 F.2d 1348 
(9th Cir. 1984) 30 
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, U.S. , 
107 S.Ct. 2425 (1987) 34, 35 
Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill.App.3d 402, 
407 N.E.2d 95 (1980) 20 
Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F.Supp. 27 (D.Mass. 1984). 11, 13, 14 
Davis v. Utah Power & Light Co., Civ. No. 87-C-0659G 
(D. Utah Nov. 23, 1988) 25, 27 
DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) 39, 40 
Dinger v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 501 F.Supp. 64 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) 38, 39 
Eitmann v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 
730 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1984) 28, 29 
Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp., 193 Cal.App.3d 489, 
238 Cal.Rptr. 360 (1987) 16 
Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209 
(9th Cir. 1980) 30 
Froyd v. Cook, 681 F.Supp. 669 (E.D.Cal. 1988) 16 
-iv-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont'd) 
Page 
Greene v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 623 F.Supp 295 
(D.Me. 1985) 11, 13, 14 
Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985) 11 
Harrison v. Edison Brothers Apparel Stores, Inc., 
724 F.Supp. 1185 (N.D.N.C. 1989) 10, 12 
Hohn v. Kaiser Cement Corp., 624 F.Supp. 549 
(D.Mont. 1986) 30 
Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 689 P.2d 1292 (Or. 1984) . 16 
Houser v. City of Redmond, 586 P.2d 482 (Wash. 1978) . . . 47, 48 
Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 609 F.Supp. 467 
(N.D.Cal. 1985) 16 
Kvenild v. Taylor, 594 P.2d 972 (Wyo. 1979) 47 
Lamb v. Briggs Manufacturing, a Division of Celotex Corp., 
700 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1983) 19, 20 
Lapinad v. Pacific Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc., 679 F.Supp. 991, 
(N.D.N.C. 1989) 12 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 
(Utah 1982) 45, 46, 47 
Lindon City v. Engineers Const. Co., 636 P.2d 1070 
(Utah 1981) 20 
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 
U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 1877 (1988) 30, 35, 36 
Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668 
(Utah 1989) 1, 2 
Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367 
(9th Cir. 1978) 39 
Mahoney v. Crocker National Bank, 571 F.Supp. 287 
(N.D.Cal. 1983) 12, 15 
Malia v. RCA Corp., 794 F.2d 909 (3d Cir. 1986) 35 
-v-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont'd) 
Page 
Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978) 28 
McCluney v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 489 F.Supp. 24 
(E.D.Wis. 1980) 12, 13 
Merrell v. All Seasons Resorts, Inc., 720 F.Supp. 815 
(C.D.Cal. 1989) 16 
Midgett v. Sackett-Chicaqo, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1280 
(111. 1985) 21 
Moore v. Utah Technical College, 727 P.2d 634 (Utah 1986). . 32 
Morrison v. Sandell, 446 N.E.2d 290 (Ill.App. 1983) 43 
Newberry v. Pacific Racing Assoc, 854 F.2d 1142 
(9th Cir. 1988) 37 
Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 
740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984) 30 
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 
174 Cal.App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) 23 
Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 
636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981) 32 
Pierce v. New Process Co., 580 F.Supp. 1543, 
(E.D.Pa. 1984), aff'd 749 F.2d 27 (3d Cir.) 12 
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965) 38 
Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 183 Cal.App.3d 1108, 
228 Cal.Rptr. 591 (1986) 16 
Rojo v. Kliger, 257 Cal.Rptr. 158 (Cal.App. 1989) 16 
Salazar v. Furr's, Inc., 629 F.Supp. 1403 
(D. Hawaii 1988) 12, 47 
Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) . . . . 41 
Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F.Supp. 910 
(E.D.Mich. 1978) 12 
Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Brothers, Miller & 
Rhoads, Inc., 565 A.2d 285 (D.C.App. 1989) 48 
-vi-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont'd) 
e 
Teamsters v. Lucas-Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) 28 
Treadwell v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
666 F.Supp. 278 (D.Mass. 1987) 48 
Trembath v. St. Regis Paper Co., 753 F.2d 603 
(7th Cir. 1985) 12 
Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d 1347 
(9th Cir. 1985) 29, 36, 37 
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & 
Car Corp. , 363 U.S. 564 (1960) 20 
University of Utah v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
736 P.2d 630 (Utah 1987) 17 
Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F.Supp. 1052 (E.D.Pa. 1977), 
aff'd, 619 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1980) 12 
Wolk v. Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc., 728 F.2d 221 
(3d Cir. 1984) 12 
-vii-
TABLE OF SECONDARY AUTHORITIES 
Page 
29 U.S.C. §185 19, 22, 28, 29, 30, 34, 40 
42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 24 
42 U.S.C. §2000e-3 24 
U.C.A. §34-1-8(1) (f) (1953) 17, 18 
U.C.A. §34-4-12 (1953) 17, 18 
U.C.A. §34-20-8 18 
U.C.A. §34-22-12 18 
U.C.A. §34-35-1, et seq 11 
U.C.A. §34-35-2(15) 25 
U.C.A. §34-35-7.1(11) 2, 3, 8, 15, 23, 24, 25 
U.C.A. §34-35-6(l)(a)(i) 24 
U.C.A. §67-21-1 25 
U.C.A. §78-2-2(3)(j) 1 
U.C.A. §78-12-25(2) 40 
U.C.A. §78-31a-3 20 
U.R.A.P. 3 1 
U.R.Civ.P. 8(a) 41 
Utah Const.,. Art. IV, Sec. 1 17 
Utah Const., Art. XII, Sec. 19 (Blacklisting) 25 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 46, Comment d (1965) . . 42 
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §129 
(4th Ed., 1971) 46 
-viii-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(3) (j) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are as follows: 
1. Should Retherford!s request to create a public policy 
exception to the at-will doctrine for a termination based on 
alleged sexual discrimination and retaliation be denied where the 
Utah Legislature has enacted the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act to 
provide a comprehensive and exclusive mechanism for remedying 
unlawful discrimination and retaliation? This issue is 
reviewable under the correctness standard. Lowe v. Sorenson 
Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). 
2. Should Retherford1s request to create a cause of action 
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy be denied, 
where Retherford1s employment was not "at-will" but could be 
terminated only for just cause pursuant to the collective 
bargaining agreement, and where Retherford has a remedy for a 
termination in violation of public policy pursuant to the 
exclusive and mandatory grievance and arbitration procedure 
contained in the collective bargaining agreement? This issue is 
reviewable under the correctness standard. Lowe v. Sorenson 
Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). 
3. Does the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act's "exclusive 
remedy" provision contained in U.C.A. §34-35-7.1(11) preclude 
Retherford's claims where those claims are based on alleged 
sexual discrimination and harassment and on alleged retaliation 
for resisting sexual discrimination and harassment? This issue 
is reviewable under the correctness standard. Lowe v. Sorenson 
Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). 
4. Are Retherfordfs claims against Appellees preempted by 
federal labor law where her claims are substantially dependant 
upon an analysis of the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement? This issue is reviewable under the correctness 
standard. Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669 
(Utah 1989). 
5. Is Retherford barred by federal law from bringing this 
action against Appellees where she failed to exhaust her remedies 
under the collective bargaining agreement, and, if not, are 
Retherford's claims barred by the six-month statute of 
limitations applicable to "hybrid 301/fair representation 
claims." This issue is reviewable under the correctness 
standard. Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669 
(Utah 1989) . 
6. Are Retherford's claims for negligent employment, 
breach of implied contract, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress barred by the statute of limitations where 
this action was filed more than four years after the events which 
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give rise to those claims first occurred? This issue is 
reviewable under the correctness standard. Lowe v. Sorenson 
Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). 
7. Has Retherford failed to state a claim against the 
individual Appellees for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress? This issue is reviewable under the correctness 
standard. Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669 
(Utah 1989) . 
8. Has Retherford failed to state a claim against the 
individual Appellees for malicious interference with contractual 
relations? This issue is reviewable under the correctness 
standard. Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669 
(Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Appellees believe that this Court's interpretation of Utah 
Code Annotated §34-35-7.1(11) will be dispositive of certain 
issues in this case. That statute provides: 
The procedures contained in this section and Section 
34-35-8 are the exclusive remedy under state law for 
employment discrimination because of race, color, agef 
religion, national origin, or handicap. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on April 7, 1989. 
[R. 2.] Retherford's complaint alleges claims against AT&T for 
wrongful termination in violation of public policy, breach of 
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implied contract, and negligent employment, and against the 
individual Appellees for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress and interference with contractual relations. 
On June 1, 1989, Appellees filed a motion to dismiss 
Retherford's complaint. [R. 47.] Following the submission of 
memoranda and affidavits by the parties, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, District Judge, issued a Minute Entry, dated September 
5, 1989, which indicated that he had treated the motion to 
dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, and had granted the 
motion in its entirety "for the reasons specified in the 
memoranda in support thereof." [R. 318.] An Order to that 
effect was signed by Judge Frederick. [R. 324-25.] Retherford's 
appeal is from that Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Retherford was initially employed as a telephone 
operator by Mountain Bell in Grand Junction, Colorado. In 
February, 1983, Retherford transferred to Mountain Bell's Wasatch 
office located in Salt Lake City, Utah. [R. 4, 1110.] On January 
1, 1984, Retherford was transferred from Mountain Bell to AT&T as 
part of the nationwide divestiture. [R. 142, 114.] 
2. While Retherford was employed by Mountain Bell and 
AT&T, she was a member of the Communication Workers of America 
and worked under, and was subject to the terms and conditions of, 
a collective bargaining agreement entered into by the union and 
her employer. [R. 142, 113.] 
-4-
3. The collective bargaining agreement prohibits AT&T from 
unlawfully discriminating against any employee because of the 
employee's sex. [R. 156, 112.2.] It also prohibits the dismissal 
of an employee without just cause. [R. 160, 11 6.2(b)(3).] It 
further provides a mandatory grievance and arbitration procedure 
to resolve employee disputes. [R. 157-162.] 
4. In May, 1984, Retherford made a formal complaint to 
AT&T's internal EEO office, claiming sexual harassment by Jolene 
Gailey. [R. 86.] AT&T's EEO office conducted an investigation 
into the allegations and determined that there had been no sexual 
harassment. [R. 238-39.] 
5. In August, 1984, Retherford filed a charge of 
discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that she had been 
subjected to sexual harassment. [R. 88.] In February, 1985, 
Retherford filed a lawsuit in federal court [the "1985 lawsuit"] 
against AT&T based upon the alleged harassment. [R. 90-96.] 
AT&T's motion to dismiss the 1985 lawsuit was granted in June, 
1985. [R. 98-99.] 
6. Retherford took a disability leave of absence from AT&T 
in September, 1985. [R. 219, 1155.] In early 1986, when she was 
able to come back to work, she informed AT&T that she could not 
return to work at AT&T's Salt Lake City office and requested that 
AT&T transfer her to a different office. AT&T had no other 
office for operators in Utah. [R. 143, 115.] 
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7. On March 12, 1986, AT&T advised Retherford that it had 
created a job for her as an operator in Boise, Idaho, Retherford 
was informed that she was required to report to the Boise office 
by March 23, 1986. On that date, Retherford failed to report to 
her new job in Boise. [R. 219, 1157.] 
8. On March 26, 1986, a letter was sent to Retherford by 
AT&T, advising her that because she had not reported for work as 
requested, her employment with AT&T was terminated. [R. 21.] 
9. In 1986, following her termination, Retherford filed a 
grievance against AT&T pursuant to the collective bargaining 
agreement. The grievance was not resolved after it had proceeded 
through step two of the grievance procedure. Retherford did not 
appeal the grievance to step three and did not pursue arbitration 
as provided in the collective bargaining agreement. [R. 143-44, 
116.] 
10. In February, 1988, almost two years after her 
termination from AT&T, Retherford filed with the EEOC another 
charge of discrimination against AT&T [the "1988 Charge"], again 
alleging that she had been subjected to sexual discrimination and 
harassment while at AT&T. [R. 103.] In July, 1988, Retherford 
filed another lawsuit in federal court [the "1988 lawsuit"] 
against Appellees and her union, alleging discrimination, 
harassment and retaliation. In March, 1989, the federal court 
entered an order granting Appellees' motion to dismiss. [R. 105-
113.] 
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11. Retherford commenced this action on April 7, 1989. 
[R. 2.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I 
A public policy exception to the at-will doctrine should be 
created only where a remedy is not otherwise available for an 
employee who has been terminated in violation of an important 
public policy. The Court should not create a cause of action for 
wrongful discharge in this case, where Retherford's claim is 
based on alleged sexual discrimination and retaliation, because 
the Utah Legislature has provided in the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Act a comprehensive remedial scheme for enforcement of the 
employee rights against sexual discrimination and retaliation, 
which remedy is exclusive. 
Point II 
A cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy should not be created in this case, where 
Retherford's employment with AT&T could not be terminated except 
for just cause, and where Retherford has a remedy for a 
termination in violation of public policy pursuant to the 
exclusive and mandatory grievance and arbitration procedure 
contained in the collective bargaining agreement. 
Point III 
The exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Anti-
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Discrimination Act, U.C.A. §34-35-7.1(11)/ preempts Retherford's 
claims based on employee discrimination, including retaliation. 
Point IV 
Actions brought under state contract law for breach of a 
collective bargaining agreement are preempted by federal law. 
Other tort and contract claims under state law also are preempted 
where the evaluation of the claims are inextricably intertwined 
with consideration of the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement, or are substantially dependent on an analysis of the 
terms of tne collective bargaining agreement. Retherford's 
claims are preempted by federal labor law. 
Point V 
Retherford's action is barred where she failed to exhaust 
the exclusive and mandatory grievance and arbitration procedures 
contained in the collective bargaining agreement. If Retherford 
was not obligated to exhaust her contractual remedies because of 
her union's negligence, she was required to bring her "hybrid 
301/fair representation claim" within six months after her 
termination. Having failed to do so, Retherford's action is 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
Point VI 
Retherford's claims for negligent employment, breach of 
implied contract, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress arose prior to August 1984. Thus, they are barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations. 
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Point VII 
Retherford has not alleged facts indicating that the 
individual Appellees engaged in conduct towards her with the 
purpose of inflicting emotional distress or where a reasonable 
person would have known that emotional distress would result. 
The facts alleged by Retherford are not, as a matter of law, of 
such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable. 
Thus, her claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
were properly dismissed. 
Point VIII 
Retherford has not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim 
for malicious interference with contractual relations. There is 
no allegation that the individual Appellees intentionally 
persuaded or conspired with another to terminate or interfere 
with her contractual relations. There also is no allegation of 
any improper purpose or improper means on behalf of the 
individual Appellees. 
-9-
ARGUMENT 
I 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CREATE A PUBLIC POLICY 
EXCEPTION TO THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE FOR A TERMINATION BASED 
ON ALLEGED SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION WHERE 
THE UTAH ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT PROVIDES A COMPREHENSIVE 
AND EXCLUSIVE MECHANISM FOR REMEDYING UNLAWFUL 
DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION 
This Court has not recognized a cause of action under Utah 
law for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. 
Although three justices of the Court have indicated their 
willingness to recognize a public policy exception to the at-will 
doctrine in an appropriate case,1 the Court has not articulated 
the precise nature and content of such an exception or the 
circumstances that would justify the adoption and application of 
such an exception. 
The Court should proceed with great care in recognizing 
public policy exceptions to the at-will doctrine. Berube, 
771 P.2d at 1050 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). 
Actions for wrongful termination based on this exception must 
involve substantial and important public policies, which should 
be narrowly construed. Berube, 771 P. 2d at 1043 (Durham, J., 
plurality opinion). This exception also should be recognized 
only where a remedy to vindicate the public policy at issue is 
not otherwise available. Harrison v. Edison Brothers Apparel 
1Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1043 
(Durham, J., plurality opinion, with Stewart, J., concurring); 
Berube, 771 P.2d at 1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result). 
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Stores, Inc., 724 F.Supp. 1185, 1193 (N.D.N.C. 1989); Crews v. 
Memorex Corp., 588 F.Supp. 27, 29 (D. Mass. 1984). 
Retherford asserts that her claim for wrongful termination 
in violation of public policy is based upon the policy embodied 
in the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act ["UADA"], U.C.A. §34-35-1, et 
seq., which prohibits employers from retaliating against 
employees for resisting sexual harassment and discrimination. 
[Appellant's Brief at 26.] The Utah Legislature has expressly 
included in the UADA a comprehensive remedial scheme for 
enforcement of employee rights against discrimination and 
retaliation. The UADA provides an aggrieved employee with the 
opportunity to remedy discriminatory or retaliatory conduct, 
first through an administrative process and thereafter by way of 
judicial action. Since the UADA grants employees a right to be 
free from discriminatory and retaliatory treatment, and provides 
a means whereby violations of those rights can be remedied, no 
separate common law cause of action is needed to remedy any 
unlawful discrimination or retaliation. 
Numerous courts have found that no common law cause of 
action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy based 
upon discrimination, harassment or retaliation exists where the 
state statute which prohibits such conduct also provides a 
remedial scheme for vindication of the rights created therein. 
See, e.g., Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1985); Crews 
v. Memorex Corp., 588 F.Supp. 27, 28-29 (D.Mass. 1984); Greene v. 
-11-
Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 623 F.Supp. 295, 299 (D.Me. 1985).^ 
The courts have so ruled even though state law recognizes a claim 
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy in 
situations where there is not a comprehensive remedial scheme to 
vindicate the public policy. Mahoney v. Crocker National Bank, 
571 F.Supp. 287, 293-94 (N.D.Cal. 1983); Schroeder v. Dayton-
Hudson Corp., 448 F.Supp. 910, 914 (E.D.Mich. 1978). Similarly, 
courts have refused to recognize claims for wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy based on alleged violations of Title 
VII because Title VII provides an adequate remedy for the 
wrongful termination. See, e.g., Harrison v. Edison Brothers 
Apparel Stores, Inc., 724 F.Supp. 1185, 1193 (N.D.N.C. 1989); 
Lapinad v. Pacific Oldsmobile-GMC, Inc., 679 F.Supp. 991, 993-94 
(D. Hawaii 1988); Salazar v. Furr's, Inc., 629 F.Supp. 1403 
(D.M.M. 1986). 
There are several policy reasons why this Court should not 
recognize a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy based on alleged discrimination and retaliation. First, 
the primary reason for creating such a cause of action is absent 
when a statutory remedy is available. The rationale for the 
2Other cases so holding include: Trembath v. St. Regis 
Paper Co., 753 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1985); Wolk v. Saks Fifth 
Avenue, Inc. , 728 F.2d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 1984); McCluney v. 
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 489 F.Supp. 24, 26-27 (D.Wis. 1980); 
Pierce v. New Process Co., 580 F.Supp. 1543, 1546 (E.D.Pa. 1984), 
aff fd, 749 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1984); Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 
438 F.Supp. 1052, 1055 (E.D.Pa. 1977), aff'd, 619 F.2d 276 (3d 
Cir. 1980). 
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initial cases which established the public policy exception to 
the traditional rule governing "at-will" employment is that a 
private remedy should be implied for employment discharges 
violative of public policy, when there is no other adequate 
remedy to vindicate the public policy. McCluney v. Joseph 
Schlitz Brewing Co., 489 F.Supp. 24, 26 (E.D.Wis. 1980). 
Confronted with this "right without a remedy" scenario, courts 
recognize a common law cause of action in order to fill the 
legislative gap. When a statutory remedy is available, there is 
no gap and the justification for judicial creativity is absent. 
Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F.Supp. 27, 29 (D.Mass. 1984). 
The creation of a cause of action based upon public policy 
against discrimination and retaliation would interfere with the 
delicate balancing of the comprehensive remedial scheme of the 
UADA. Greene v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 623 F.Supp. 295, 299 
(D.Me. 1985). The UADA reflects the Utah Legislature's balancing 
of competing interests. Employees are protected against certain 
types of conduct. Employers are protected against certain 
litigation by a relatively short statute of limitations and a 
mandatory conciliation process. The appropriate remedies, as 
determined by the Legislature, have been established with both 
the employee and employer in mind. The creation of a new cause 
3Retherford argues that the remedies created by the UADA are 
inadequate to compensate her for the injuries she allegedly 
sustained. [Retherfordfs Brief at 46-47.] Where the Legislature 
prohibits sex discrimination and related retaliation in 
-13-
of action would allow an employee to bypass the legislatively 
mandated prerequisites for judicial relief. Crews v. Memorex 
Corp., 588 F.Supp. 27, 29 (D.Mass. 1984). This Court should not 
tamper with the scheme which the Legislature has established when 
there is no need to do so to provide an employee who allegedly 
has been discriminated or retaliated against with an adequate 
remedy. Greene v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 623 F.Supp. 295, 
299 (D.Me. 1985). 
Creation of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy based on discrimination, harassment or retaliation 
also would duplicate the remedies already provided by the UADA. 
Since courts do not look with favor upon the creation of 
duplicate remedies, recognition of such a claim would be 
unnecessary and improper. Crews v. Memorex Corp., 
588 F.Supp. 27, 29 (D.Mass. 1984); Greene v. Union Mutual Life 
Ins. Co., 623 F.Supp. 295, 299 (D.Me. 1985).4 
employment, and creates a cause of action in favor of an employee 
who has been subjected to such conduct, it is entitled to 
determine the appropriate and exclusive remedies that may be 
imposed if those provisions are violated. 
4The United States Supreme Court has held that the pursuit 
of a Title VII claim does not necessarily preclude the pursuit of 
other rights under a state discrimination statute or other 
applicable state and federal statutes. Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974). The right to pursue parallel 
or overlapping statutory claims, which are not otherwise 
preempted, does not constitute authority or precedent to create a 
new common law remedy which interferes with the otherwise 
exclusive remedial provisions contained in a state discrimination 
statute. 
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The courts in several of the cases cited by Retherford 
relied on the following principle of law in recognizing a cause 
of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy 
based on sexual discrimination, harassment or retaliation: 
As a general rule, if a statute which provides for 
a new remedy shows no intention to negate, either 
expressly or by necessary implication, a pre-existing 
common law remedy, the new remedy will be regarded as 
merely cumulative, rather than exclusive, with the 
result that a plaintiff may resort to either the pre-
existing remedy or the new remedy. 
Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1303 (Or. 
1984).6 The courts in Holien, Rojo, Merrell and Froyd7 
determined that common law causes of action for sexual 
discrimination or harassment existed under Oregon and California 
law prior to the enactment of the statutory remedies for such 
conduct. Accordingly, it was held that the statutory remedies 
°See also Rojo v. Kliger, 257 Cal.Rptr. 158, 166 (Cal.App. 
1989); Merrell v. All Seasons Resorts, Inc., 720 F.Supp. 815, 
824-25 (C.D.Cal. 1989); Froyd v. Cook, 681 F.Supp 669, 674 
(E.D.Cal. 1988). 
'The holdings in Rojo, Merrell and Froyd are contrary to 
several other California state and federal court decisions which 
have addressed the issue in question. Robinson v. Hewlett-
Packard Corp., 183 Cal.App.3d 1108, 1125, 228 Cal.Rptr. 591 
(1986)(racial discrimination); Ficalora v. Lockheed Corp., 193 
Cal.App.3d 489, 238 Cal.Rptr 360 (1987)(retaliatory discharge); 
Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 608 F.Supp. 1315, 1322 
(N.D.Cal. 1984)(religious discrimination); Hudson v. Moore 
Business Forms, Inc., 609 F.Supp. 467, 474 (N.D.Cal. 1985)(sex 
discrimination). The California Supreme Court has not yet ruled 
on the issue, although it has agreed to review the Rojo case. 
Merrell, 720 F.Supp. at 818-19 n.l. 
-16-
. • -.
 p
 r* r c e x u a 1 
discriri. , iu . exclus ive . 
q
 * * * however , h ^ r r f^ yei r e c o a n : -• 
i - t u . . a t u r i : s e s i s t i n c i conduct- P '~>r • *
 c JAD- ' •* 
•* : -* -nf.- a g a i .. J •„ 
- * .. i m i n a t i v . c u e ' . «-- ,cii.ci: . ,«• J n p l o y e i a g o . u t din 
e m p l o y e e , :i *- • » *-r • - •• * •>
 0 i i u c r* - i i II11 I 
, i c i r
 -'-
 1
" *
:
 > - - ! - ' ^c:* a n d i c a p . U n i v e r s i t y of I ' t a : 
. ^ . rv r l a J Commiss ic :_ . 
^- * *-••
 !
 *"' arq-i-np'i4 * ..t- c u m M r / i:. . i r n o u ' n *• 
t at sTons t i t u* i i . j quo- - io tp t - t n ^ r < h, - *ht * ; ^ * / e ~ ^
 L U v 
p r o v i u c B t i i a ' uic»; t: c u e :»-!•..' * . i t j z e n s \ha - i_v ^ q u a . , J 
. - , i. * i , ^ J U S t 
w r i i P t n e t o r e g o i n q c i-> * * ; p r o v i s i o n ~ -; in ^ r m ~ ^ -•- *-
-
 n i v e
 M e d i c a l L x e c t r o n i c s , inc. v» Indus-• 
Commi s s i o n o t J J t a r , ' ^ t * - - - , m c u 
~' . . common
 M-. 
* d k i 3 - . d c t i w ' i ~ : e n p i o y m e ' 2 s c r i m i n a : ; ..-• 
^ ^ - ' [ ^ ^ ^ • '-• - . r , ^ 1 - - il I I I I I il I I I Il 
^ edu iLO . . . e tMidi I men I HI I lit' IIMWi i 
misplaced. Section 34-1-8(1)(f)f which has been recodified at 
§34-20-8, is part of the chapter involving employment relations 
and collective bargaining. Section 34-4-12, which has been 
recodified at §34-22-12, is part of the chapter entitled "Women 
and Children—Conditions of Labor and Employment." Neither of 
those provisions prohibited sex discrimination, sexual harassment 
or retaliation based thereon, or penalized an employer which 
engaged in such conduct in the workplace. A cause of action 
based upon such conduct only arose as a result of the enactment 
of the UADA. 
This Court should reject Plaintiff's attempt to create a 
cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public 
policy where the claimed violation is based upon alleged 
discrimination or retaliation. 
II 
A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION 
IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY SHOULD NOT BE CREATED 
WHERE RETHERFORD WAS NOT AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE BUT 
COULD ONLY BE TERMINATED FOR JUST CAUSE AND 
WHERE SHE HAD A REMEDY FOR A TERMINATION IN 
VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
The reasons which arguably justify the recognition of the 
public policy exception in an employment at-will case do not 
apply in a situation where the employee may only be terminated 
for just cause. In an at-will employment relationship, an 
employee may be terminated with or without just cause. If an 
employer terminates an at-will employee for a reason which 
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There exists a public policy to promote industrial peace by 
facilitating orderly, bilateral industrial relations. Public 
policy also dictates that parties to collective bargaining 
agreements resolve disputes covered by the agreement exclusively 
through the agreed-upon grievance and arbitration procedures 
contained in the contract. To permit an employee covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement to bring a claim for wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy is to invite strife 
unnecessarily. Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill.App.3d 
402, 406, 407 N.E.2d 95 (1980). The "public policy exception" to 
the at-will doctrine should be tailored so as not to obliterate 
other "public policies" of the state and nation, such as the 
protection of orderly industrial relations. Lamb v. Briggs 
Manufacturing, a Division of Celotex Corp., 700 F.2d 1092, 1095 
(7th Cir. 1983) . 
State and federal policy favor the use of arbitration where 
provided under a collective bargaining agreement. See U.C.A. 
§78-31a-3; Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co., 
636 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Utah 1981); United Steelworkers of America 
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 564, 567, 568 (1960). 
By recognizing Retherford's claim, the Court would be sanctioning 
Retherford's circumvention of the grievance and arbitration 
procedures contained in the collective bargaining agreement. 
The cases cited by Retherford in support of her position 
overlook the specific policy reason which caused the courts to 
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part of the trade-off union employees accept in exchange for the 
many rights they benefit from—rights not enjoyed by employees at 
will. As part of the give and take which exists in the 
collective bargaining process, both employers and employees give 
up certain rights or benefits in exchange for other rights and 
benefits. That process is favored by both state and federal 
policy, and should not be impaired by extending a "public policy 
exception to the at-will doctrine" to employees who only may be 
terminated for just cause and who have agreed to pursue their 
claims in accordance with the remedies provided by the collective 
bargaining agreement. 
Pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement 
which governed Retherford's employment, Retherford could be 
terminated only for just cause. [R. 160, 116.2(b)(3).] The 
collective bargaining agreement provided a grievance and 
arbitration procedure to ensure Retherford relief if terminated 
without just cause. [R. 157-162.] If Retherford felt her 
termination was in violation of public policy, she was free to 
pursue her contractual remedies8 or sue for breach of contract 
under §301 of the LMRA. The policy reasons identified above 
^Retherford denies that she had a remedy under the 
collective bargaining agreement. [Retherford's Brief at 28.] 
That assertion is belied by the fact that she filed a grievance 
to remedy her discharge. [R. 143, 116.] It was not the lack of a 
contractual remedy that prevented her from challenging her 
termination, but rather her unwillingness to pursue her grievance 
through all steps of the grievance and arbitration process. 
[R. 143-44, 116.] 
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III 
THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION OF THE UTAH 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT PREEMPTS RETHERFORD'S n.AIM^ 
i i . ; . uui w sexadJ. 
J i b i i n n i n a t i o n , ha r a s smen t ui r e < a l i a t i : *e l i o n J 4 - J D , . ^ V ^ , 
w*. ww*- JADA s t a t e s : 
(11) The procedures contained in this section and 
Section 34-35-8 are the exclusive remedy i inder state 
law for employee discrimination because of race, color, 
sex, a ': -j r e 1 i g i o n, n a t i o n a 1 o r i q I n , o r h a n d i c a p. 
[Emphr -*dded. ] 
'The It-u M a t u r e has mad* ' • "- ' ^  * :• procedures 
provided i* - M»A are the exciusivt 
I 1 i,'-'i" I II I I I }!< ' " 
:
' Re the r f ord * s i:e 1 iance on Petermann_,"< 11 ite r na t iona 1 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, e t c , 17 4 Ca 1. App 7l cT 18 4 , 344 P. 2 d ' 2 5 
(1959) is misplaced. Although Petermann was a union member, the 
collective bargaining agreement which governed his employment did 
not provide a remedy for the conduct by which he was injured. 
The absence of a contractual remedy necessitated the creation of 
a new cause of action. In this case f however, Retherford not 
only was entitled to fi 1 e a grievance regarding her termination, 
5
 *• - ~ n v i red to do so. 
While Retherford concedes that the procedures set forth in 
the UADA are the exclusive remedy for "employment discrimination" 
pursuant to §34-35-7.1(11), she argues that the exclusive remedy 
provision does not govern "retaliation". Such an argument is 
without merit. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has one provision 
prohibiting unlawful discrimination based upon race, color, sex, 
religion, or national origin, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2, and a separate 
provision prohibiting retaliation against an employee who asserts 
protected rights, 42 U.S.C. §20003-3. The UADA, however, defines 
discrimination as including retaliation, as follows: 
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice: 
(a)(i) for an employer to refuse to hire, or 
promote or to discharge, demote, 
terminate any person, or to retaliate 
against, or discriminate in matters of 
compensation or in terms, privileges, 
and conditions of employment against any 
person otherwise qualified, because of 
race, color, sex, age, if the individual 
is 40 years of age or older, religion, 
national original, or handicap . . . . 
[Emphasis added.] 
U.C.A. §34-35-6(l)(a)(i). 
As set forth in the foregoing statute, retaliation against 
any person because of race, color, sex, age, religion, national 
origin or handicap constitutes employment discrimination within 
the meaning of the UADA. Thus, the exclusive remedy provision 
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advances and contact. When she objected to the repeated advances 
by the supervisor, she was coerced into signing a release of 
liability and thereafter was terminated without cause. [Appendix 
1 at 2.] The plaintiff's complaint asserted sexual 
discrimination and harassment claims under Title VII and numerous 
state law claims. 
The defendants moved to dismiss the state law claims, 
contending that they were preempted by the UADA's exclusive 
remedy provision. In interpreting the exclusive remedy 
provision, Judge Greene stated: 
This court reads the exclusive remedy provision of 
the Act as only foreclosing those common law causes of 
action which are based upon the very conduct which is 
necessary to prove sexual harassment or sex 
discrimination under the Act, namely, conduct expressly 
prohibited by the Act or conduct satisfying all the 
essential elements of a prima facie case. [Appendix 1 
at 12. ] 
Retherford's claim for wrongful termination in violation of 
public policy is based on conduct expressly prohibited by the 
UADA, and is therefore preempted by the exclusive remedy 
provision. Retherford's claim for breach of implied contract 
also is essentially a claim for alleged wrongful termination 
grounded in sexual discrimination and retaliation. Because the 
implied contract claim is based on the same discriminatory and 
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IV 
RETHERFORD'S CLAIMS AGAINST APPELLEES ARE 
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LABOR LAW AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
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for breach of implied contract arising out ot an emplo\— 
handbook was essentially a claim for wrongful termination 
grounded in sexual discrimination and was preempted by the UADA. 
[Append.! x .'" at- i" | 
Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985). Congressional 
power to legislate in the area of labor relations has long been 
established. Id. While federal law does not preempt all local 
regulations which touch or concern in any way the interrelation-
ships between employees, employers and unions, id. at 208 n.4, 
local regulation is preempted if it conflicts with federal law or 
would frustrate the federal scheme or if the courts discern from 
the totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to occupy 
the field to the exclusion of the states. Id. at 209; Malone v. 
White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978). 
A. State Law Contract Claims are 
Preempted by Federal Labor Law. 
Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act ["LMRA"], 
29 U.S.C. §185f provides that suits for violations of collective 
bargaining agreements may be brought in federal district court. 
That section has been held by the courts to reflect a 
congressional intent to promote industrial peace by ensuring 
uniform application of federal law to the enforcement of 
collective bargaining agreements. Eitmann v. New Orleans Public 
Service, Inc., 730 F.2d 359, 361 (5th Cir. 1984). The federal 
courts have recognized the mandate of Congress to fashion a body 
of federal common law to be used to address disputes arising out 
of labor contracts. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 209. 
The preemptive effect of §301 was first analyzed in 
Teamsters v. Lucas-Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). In that case, 
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dismissed their action, ruling that those claims were preempted 
by federal labor law because the evaluation of those claims was 
dependent upon an analysis of the provisions of the collective 
bargaining agreement which governed the employees. Id. at 
1350.l;L 
Plaintiff's reliance upon the U.S. Supreme Court's decision 
in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., U.S. , 
108 S.Ct. 1877 (1988), is misplaced. The Court in Lingle did 
nothing to alter the principle set forth in Allis-Chalmers that 
when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent 
upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the 
parties to a labor contract, the plaintiff's claim is preempted 
by §301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947. Allis-
Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 200. 
In Lingle, an employee brought a state court action claiming 
that she was terminated for exercising rights under the Illinois 
Workers' Compensation Act. The Supreme Court held that since the 
application of state law did not require the interpretation of a 
collective bargaining agreement, that application of state law 
was not preempted by §301 of the LMRA. Lingle, 108 S.Ct. at 
1885. 
11Other decisions are in accord: Olguin v. Inspiration 
Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1472-76 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 736 F.2d 1348, 1350-52 (9th 
Cir. 1984); Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 
(9th Cir. 1980); Hohn v. Kaiser Cement Corp., 624 F.Supp. 549, 
551 (D.Mont. 1986). 
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2. The Breach of Implied Contract 
Claim Against AT&T is Preempted by 
Federal Law, 
(a) The Code of Conduct does not 
constitute an implied contract 
between AT&T and Plaintiff. 
Retherford's claim for breach of implied contract is based 
upon a provision in a pamphlet known as the Code of Conduct. The 
provision in question states that AT&T prohibits sexual 
harassment of its employees in any form. 
An employer's policy manual may give rise to employee 
contractual rights. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.y 771 P.2d 
1033, 1044 (Utah 1989); Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State 
College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1066 n.5 (Utah 1981). As with any 
implied contract, however, whether an employer's policy manual 
creates a contract turns on the intent of the parties. See Moore 
v. Utah Technical College, 727 P.2d 634, 642 (Utah 1986). 
In an attempt to avoid preemption of her claim for breach of 
implied contract, Plaintiff argues that the Code of Conduct is an 
independent agreement between the parties, totally separate from 
the collective bargaining agreement. No facts are set forth in 
the complaint which support the conclusory allegation. 
Agreements between AT&T and its union employees are 
negotiated by AT&T with the union, which is the employee's 
an employee believes that the company's actions are in violation 
of the terms of the agreement. [R. 157-162.] 
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exclusive bargaining agent. [R. 154, 111.1.] The collective 
bargaining agreement which has been entered into by AT&T and the 
union, on behalf of its members, "sets forth the terms and 
conditions of employment applicable to all employees of the 
Company for whom the Union is the recognized bargaining agent 
. . . and supersedes all prior recognition and working agreements 
between the parties." [R. 154.] 
The Code of Conduct is not a separate agreement between AT&T 
and its employees. It is merely an internal company document 
which "sets forth basic principles to help define standards of 
conduct." [R. 225.] It expressly states: "The Code is not all 
encompassing. Other company policies, practices and 
instructions, as well as common sense standards of conduct also 
apply." [R. 225.] The provisions contained in the Code of 
Conduct regarding sexual harassment and retaliation are in 
harmony with the provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement. There is no evidence that the statement of policy set 
forth in the Code of Conduct constitutes a contractual provision 
between the parties, independent from the collective bargaining 
agreement. 
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(b) Retherford's claim for breach 
of implied contract arising 
out of the Code of Conduct is 
dependent upon an analysis of 
the collective bargaining 
agreement. 
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act governs 
claims founded directly on rights created by collective 
bargaining agreements/ and also governs claims "substantially 
dependent on analysis of a collective bargaining agreement. 
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, U.S. , 107 S.Ct 2425, 2431 
(1987). Regardless of whether the Code of Conduct is a separate 
and independent agreement not founded directly on rights created 
by the collective bargaining agreement, Retherford's claim for 
breach of implied contract is preempted because it is dependent 
on an analysis of the collective bargaining agreement. 
In order to determine whether the "exclusive agreement" 
language in the collective bargaining agreement renders the Code 
of Conduct merely a part of the agreement, supercedes it, or has 
no effect whatsoever on it, an analysis of the collective 
bargaining agreement must be made. In order to determine whether 
an employee may or must pursue any claim for breach of the Code 
of Conduct through the grievance and arbitration procedures 
provided in the collective bargaining agreement, an analysis of 
the collective bargaining agreement is required. 
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Retherford relies on two cases, Caterpillar Inc. v. 
Williams, U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 2425 (1987) and Malia v. RCA 
Corp. , 794 F.2d 909, 911 (3d Cir. 1986), in support of her 
argument that her contract claim based on the Code of Conduct is 
not preempted by federal law. Those cases involved contracts 
entered into by employees relating to management positions 
outside the bargaining unit. The collective bargaining 
agreements which covered their regular employment did not govern 
their employment in the managerial positions. See Caterpillar, 
Inc., 107 S.Ct. at 2427; Malia, 794 F.2d at 911. Since the 
determination of their claims for breach of the individual 
contracts was not founded directly on rights created by the 
collective bargaining agreement, and did not depend upon an 
analysis of, or interfere with, the collective bargaining 
agreement, the breach of contract claims in those two cases were 
not preempted. 
Unlike the situation found in Caterpillar, Inc. and Malia, 
Retherfordfs breach of implied contract claim is "inextricable 
intertwined11 with consideration of the collective bargaining 
agreement and cannot be adjudicated without reference to it. 
Accordingly, that claim is preempted. Lingle, 108 S.Ct. at 1885. 
3. Retherford's Negligent Employment 
Claim is Preempted by Federal Law. 
Retherford claims that AT&T is liable for negligent 
employment because it retained Gailey, Johnson and Randall as 
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employees, despite knowledge of their harassment of Retherford. 
The collective bargaining agreement sets forth the grounds for 
which an employee may be terminated. It also sets forth the 
procedures which must be followed in terminating an employee. 
AT&T's right or obligation to terminate or otherwise discipline 
Gailey, Johnson and Randall was governed by the collective 
bargaining agreement. 
In order to decide the negligent retention claim, it must be 
determined whether AT&T acted appropriately in dealing with 
Gailey, Johnson and Randall. Since the negligent retention claim 
is dependent upon analysis of the collective bargaining 
agreement, that claim is preempted by federal law. Lingle, 108 
S.Ct at 1885; Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d 1347, 
1350 (9th Cir. 1985). 
4. Retherford's Claims for Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress and 
Malicious Interference with Contractual 
Relations also are Preempted by Federal 
Law. 
Retherfordfs tort claims against Appellees Bateson-Hough, 
Johnson and Randall are based upon alleged retaliatory 
harassment. Retherford does not specify in her complaint the 
acts allegedly engaged in by Johnson and Randall which constitute 
harassment. She alleges that Bateson-Hough actively supported 
the harassment by instructing Retherford that if she continued to 
complain about Gailey*s conduct, she would be terminated, and by 
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refusing to prevent the continuation of such harassment. [R. 13, 
1151.] 
Retherford's emotional distress claims and interference with 
contract claims arise out of her employment and discharge. In 
order to determine the validity of those tort claims against 
Bateson-Hough, Johnson and Randall, it must be determined whether 
their conduct in the work place was improper, whether Bateson-
Hough was authorized to monitor Retherford's performance, to 
reprimand or criticize her, to ask her to stop complaining or to 
require her to sit at a designated work station; and whether 
Retherford could have filed, or had a duty to file, a grievance 
regarding the actions of the individual Appellees. A 
determination of the validity of those claims also requires a 
determination of whether her discharge was justified under the 
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Those issues 
cannot be decided without interpreting or analyzing the terms of 
the collective bargaining agreement. Newberry v. Pacific Racing 
Assoc, 854 F.2d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 1988). 
Since the evaluation of Retherford's tort claims against 
Bateson-Hough, Johnson and Randall are "inextricably intertwined 
with an analysis of the terms of the labor contract, Retherford's 
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
interference with contract are preempted and were properly 
dismissed. Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d 1327, 
1352 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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IV 
RETHERFORD'S CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED WHERE 
SHE FAILED TO EXHAUST HER REMEDIES UNDER THE COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENT ORf ALTERNATIVELY, HER CLAIMS 
ARE BARRED BY THE SIX-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
A. Retherford's Claims Are Barred Where She Failed To 
Exhaust Her Contractual Remedies 
An aggrieved employee cannot seek judicial relief against an 
employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement if the 
employee has sidestepped the grievance-arbitration machinery 
which the agreement provides as the employee's exclusive remedy. 
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650ir 652-53 (1965). The 
claims made against Appellees all involve matters which were 
subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures of the 
collective bargaining agreement, and those procedures were 
intended by the parties to be their exclusive remedy. [R. 158, 
115.5, 159, 116.1.] 
Retherford did not attempt to utilize the grievance 
machinery until after her employment was terminated. Thereafter, 
she filed a grievance but did not pursue the grievance past step 
two. [R. 143-44, 116.] As a result, her claims for breach of 
contract are barred by the exhaustion doctrine articulated in 
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965). For 
the same reasons, Retherford's failure to exhaust her grievance 
remedies also is a bar to her tort claims against Appellees. 
Dinger v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 501 F.Supp. 64, 71 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
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In Dinger, the court stated: 
It is foreseeable and understandable that any 
employee who allows unresolved grievances to accumulate 
can reach a point of suffering emotional distress from 
feeling that he has been wronged. See Magnuson v. 
Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th 
Cir. 1978). This does not change a contract claim into 
a tort claim. Id. Moreover, to allow him to reach 
that point without submitting his grievances to the 
dispute resolution machinery which the union and the 
employer have chosen as exclusive, and to allow him to 
proceed in court on a tort theory would deprive both 
parties to the agreement of the benefit of their 
bargain. This could result in making employers less 
willing to bind themselves to exclusive grievance-
arbitration machinery, and could undermine the union's 
position as collective bargaining representative. 
Dinger, 501 F.Supp. 64, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See also Magnuson v. 
Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1978). 
Since Retherford failed to exhaust her grievance remedies, 
the district court properly dismissed her related tort claims 
against Appellees. 
B. If Retherford's Claims Are Not Barred Because She 
Failed To Exhaust Her Contractual Remedies, Her 
Claims Nevertheless Are Barred By The Six-Month 
Statute Of Limitations 
Retherford alleges that she failed to exhaust her 
contractual remedies as a result of the union's negligence. If, 
as alleged, Retherford has a "fair representation" claim against 
her union, she may bring her claims arising out of the alleged 
breach of the collective bargaining agreement under §301 of the 
LMRA against either the employer, the union, or both. 
DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 165 (1983). This type of 
action is referred to as a "hybrid 301/fair representation 
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claim," amounting to "a direct challenge to 'the private 
settlement of disputes under the collective bargaining 
agreement.'" DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165. 
The applicable statute of limitations for a hybrid case 
under §301 is six months. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172. This 
action was commenced after the six-month limitation period had 
passed. Thus, even if Retherford did not have to exhaust her 
remedies, and even if her claims were not dismissed but instead 
treated as §301 claims, those claims are barred by the six-month 
statute of limitations. 
VI 
RETHERFORD1S CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENT EMPLOYMENT, 
BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT, AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION 
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Any claim for negligent retention or breach of implied 
contract which Retherford may arguably have against AT&T arose at 
the time Retherford first believed she was being harassed or 
discriminated against by her co-workers. Since any such conduct 
allegedly began prior to the time Retherford submitted a written 
complaint to AT&T's EEO Coordinator in May, 1984 [R. 210, 1123; 
238-39], Retherford's claims for negligent retention and breach 
of implied contract are barred by the four-year statute of 
limitations. U.C.A. §78-12-25(2). 
Similarly, the alleged conduct of the individual Appellees 
which forms the basis of Retherford1s claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress commenced prior to May, 1984. 
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[R. 12-14.] Those claims also are barred by the four-year 
statute of limitations. 
VII 
RETHERFORD FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THE 
INDIVIDUAL APPELLEES FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS FAIL TO STATE CLAIMS 
OPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED 
In Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47 
(1961), this Court stated that an action for emotional distress 
may be maintained where (1) the defendant intentionally engaged 
in some conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the purpose of 
inflicting emotional distress, or (b) where any reasonable person 
would have known that such would result, and (2) his actions are 
of such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable 
in that they offend against the generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality. 
Throughout the complaint, Retherford makes numerous 
conclusory statements to the effect that she was subjected to 
sexual discrimination or harassment by some of her co-workers. 
At no time does she allege any facts that evidence an act of 
discrimination or harassment against her. 
Retherford asserts, however, that her affidavit contains 
allegations of specific facts which support her claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.14 None of the 
X4Under the rules, a claim for relief shall be set forth in 
a pleading, not in an affidavit. U.R.Civ.P. 8(a). 
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facts asserted in the affidavit allege that Appellees engaged in 
conduct towards Retherford with the purpose of inflicting 
emotional distress or where a reasonable person would have known 
that emotional distress would result. 
Moreover, the facts alleged are not, as a matter of law, of 
such a nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in 
that they offend against the generally accepted standards of 
decency and morality. In Comment d to Section 46 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), it states: 
First, the conduct must be extreme and outrageous. The 
liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, 
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions or 
trivialities. "It has not been enough that the 
defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or 
even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict 
emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been 
characterized by 'malice,f or a degree of aggravation 
which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages 
for another tort. Liability has been found only where 
the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so 
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds 
of decency * * *." 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 46, Comment d (1965) 
(emphasis added). 
Neither the complaint nor the affidavit alleges acts by 
Bateson-Hough that reasonably could be considered "outrageous and 
intolerable." Retherford does not allege that Bateson-Hough 
engaged in any discriminatory conduct towards her but merely 
asserts that she "supported" it or failed to prevent it. 
Clearly, such allegations do not state a claim for outrageous 
conduct. Similarly, the alleged acts of retaliation, i.e., 
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monitoring Retherford1s work, requiring Retherford to sit by a 
co-worker, criticizing her in public, and asking her to stop 
complaining, do not constitute outrageous conduct. See Morrison 
v. Sandell, 446 N.E.2d 290, 292 (Ill.App. 1983). 
With respect to Johnson, Retherford does not allege any 
facts which could be considered outrageous or intolerable. 
Retherford1s affidavit only alleges one instance when Johnson 
made comments directly to Retherford. [R. 217, 1114.] Retherford 
makes reference to two other statements which were allegedly made 
by Johnson to another person while she was looking at Retherford. 
[R. 212, 1130; 213-14, 1136.] The only other direct contact which 
Retherford claims Johnson had with her was when Appellees (and 
not specifically Johnson) stared at and made "hostile facial 
expressions" toward her, sat and walked near her, and talked 
about her amongst themselves. 5 [R. 215, 1140.] Such alleged 
comments and conduct, even if true, are not outrageous and 
intolerable as a matter of law. 
Retherford alleges that Randall stated to her on one 
occasion, "It's too bad we're being watched all the time." [R. 
"Retherford also alleges that Johnson made other sexually-
oriented comments to others which Retherford overheard, and that 
Johnson engaged in other sexually-oriented conduct. [R. 216, 
1111 43-45; 218, 1149.] Retherford does not allege that such 
conversations and conduct were directed to her, made reference to 
her, or were intended to cause her any distress. 
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219, 11 54.] The only other conduct attributed to Randall was the 
purported kissing of a co-worker, which conduct is not alleged to 
have been directed to Retherford or made for the purpose of 
causing Retherford any distress. [R. 217, 1147.] The alleged 
comment and action by Randall cannot reasonably be construed as 
being outrageous and intolerable. 
The district court was warranted in dismissing Retherford1s 
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
VIII 
RETHERFORD FAILED TO STATE A 
CLAIM AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL 
APPELLEES FOR MALICIOUS INTERFERENCE 
WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 
The Utah Supreme Court in Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 
368 P.2d 597 (1962), set forth a general description of the tort 
of intentional interference with contract: 
It is generally recognized in a majority of 
jurisdictions that one who persuades another or 
conspires with another to breach a contract is guilty 
of an actionable tort, unless such persuasion or other 
action causing the breach was done with just cause or 
excuse. It is also generally recognized that even 
though a defendant's action brings about a breach of 
contract, he is not liable where the breach was caused 
by the doing of an act which he had a legal right to 
do. 
Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d at 602. 
The motive and conduct of a third party are important 
considerations in determining whether a third party has any 
liability for a breach of contract by one of the parties thereto. 
As stated by this Court: 
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Where persons have merely pursued their own ends 
without any desire or intention of causing another to 
breach his contract, they should not be held liable for 
the other's breach. To hold them liable for damages so 
far removed from their action would amount to an undue 
restraint upon their freedom to act. 
Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d at 603. 
In order to prevail on her claim for intentional 
interference with contractual relations, Retherford must prove 
the following: 
(1) That the individual Appellees intentionally 
persuaded another or conspired with another to breach 
the collective bargaining agreement which governed 
Retherford's employment, or otherwise intentionally 
interfered with Retherford's contractual relations; 
(2) That such intentional action was for an 
improper purpose or by improper means or otherwise 
without just cause or excuse; and 
(3) That such intentional action caused injury to 
Retherford. 
Bunnell, 368 P.2d at 602; Isom, 657 P.2d at 304.16 
A. Retherford Has Not Alleged Facts 
Sufficient to State a Claim Against the 
Individual Appellees, 
Retherford has not alleged that any of the individual 
Appellees intentionally persuaded another or conspired with 
16In Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 
(Utah 1982), this Court indicated that the right of action for 
interference with a specific contract is but one instance, rather 
than the total class, of protections against wrongful 
interference with advantageous economic relations. Isom, 657 
P. 2d at 301. Thus, the Court's analysis of the tort of wrongful 
interference with advantageous economic relations is applicable 
to the tort of intentional interference with contractual 
relations. 
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another to breach the collective bargaining agreement or 
otherwise intentionally interfered with Retherford's contractual 
relations. There are no facts alleged which indicate that any of 
the individual Appellees caused, or were even involved with, 
Retherford's termination. 
More importantly, Retherford has not alleged that any action 
taken by the individual Appellees was for an improper purpose. 
Improper purpose in this context has been defined by Professor 
Prosser to include "a purely malicious motive, in the sense of 
spite" and "a desire to do harm to the plaintiff for its own 
sake." Isom, 657 P.2d at 293 [quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of 
the Law of Torts, §129 at 943 (4th Ed., 1971)]. There is no 
allegation to suggest that any such improper purpose or motive 
existed on the part of any of the individual Appellees. 
There is no allegation in the complaint that the alleged 
intentional actions of the individual Appellees were by improper 
means. Acts commonly included in the phrase "improper means" are 
violence, threats, or other intimidation, deceit or 
misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, defamation or 
disparaging falsehood. Isom, 657 P. 2d at 308. Retherford does 
not allege that improper means were used by the individual 
Appellees to interfere with her contractual relations. 
Retherford's claim for malicious interference with 
contractual relations was properly dismissed by the district 
court. 
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B. Appellee Bateson-Hough, Who at All Times 
was AT&T's Managery Cannot be Liable for 
Malicious Interference with Contractual 
Relations as a Matter of Law, 
The law is well-settled in Utah that one party to a contract 
cannot be liable for the tort of interference with contract for 
inducing a breach by himself or the other contracting party. 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co, v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 
1982). Pursuant to that rule, AT&T, one of the parties to the 
agreement, could not be liable for tortious interference with 
that agreement. 
The scope of this legal principle extends beyond the parties 
to the agreement to encompass the agents of the parties also. 
Kvenild v. Taylor, 594 P.2d 972, 977 (Wyo. 1979); Houser v. City 
of Redmond, 586 P.2d 482, 485 (Wash. 1978); Salazar v. Furr's, 
Inc., 629 F.Supp. 1403, 1410 (D.N.M. 1986). 
In Houser v. City of Redmond, 586 P.2d 482 (Wash. 1978), a 
former city police officer alleged that certain fellow officers 
engaged in activities constituting intentional interference with 
contract. The plaintiff argued that the fellow officers were 
third parties with respect to the employment agreement between 
the plaintiff and the city. The Washington Supreme Court, in 
rejecting that claim, stated: 
The employees are only third parties if they were 
not acting within the scope of their employment. A 
municipal corporation, like any corporation, can act 
only through its agents, and when its agents act within 
the scope of their employment their actions are the 
actions of the city itself. [Citation omitted.] Thus, 
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if Redmond's employees were acting within the scope of 
their employment, their actions were Redmond1s, and no 
interference claim will lie. 
Houser, 586 P.2d at 485. 
Bateson-Hough was the manager of AT&T's Wasatch office. [R. 
12, 1(49.] At all times, she was acting within the scope of her 
employment. Her actions were the actions of AT&T. As a result, 
she cannot be held liable to Retherford, as a matter of law, for 
interference with contractual relations since she is deemed to be 
a party to the collective bargaining agreement. 
Only two of the cases cited by Retherford in her brief in 
support of her position addressed the issue in question. Those 
cases are not determinative of the issue in this case, where they 
involved supervisory personnel who were not part of management. 
Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Brothers, Miller & Rhoads, Inc., 
565 A.2d 285, 290 (D.C.App. 1989); Treadwell v. John Hancock 
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 666 F.Supp. 278, 280 (D.Mass. 1987). None 
of the cases cited involved a person who held a management 
position such as Bateson-Hough held with AT&T. 
Since Bateson-Hough cannot be liable to Retherford for 
intentional interference with contractual relations, the district 
court's dismissal of this claim against Bateson-Hough should be 
sustained. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the authorities and arguments set forth herein, 
Appellees respectfully request that the Court affirm the order of 
the district court granting Appellees' motion to dismiss. 
DATED this ? ™ day of July, 1990. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
&LiM.kL 
Richard M. Hymas, 'Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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I hereby certify that on this day of July, 1990, I 
served upon Plaintiff/Appellant four (4) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES, by causing the same to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Richard W. Perkins, Esq. 
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION 
NICKIE LARSEN DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
EMERY MINING CORPORATION, Civil No. 87-C-0659G 
STANLEY A. RAJSKI, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the court on April 6, 1988, 
pursuant to defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Nickie Larsen Davis ("plaintiff") was represented by Ann Wise, 
Stanley A. Rajski ("Rajski") was represented by Samuel Gaufin, 
Utah Power & Light (UP&L) was represented by Paul Proctor, and 
Emery Mining Corporation ("Emery Mining") was represented by 
David Anderson. The parties submitted memoranda and presented 
oral argument, after which the court took the matter under 
advisement. Thereafter, counsel for the parties advised the 
court that settlement negotiations were underway and that no 
ruling would be required. Following protracted settlement 
negotiations and a hearing concerning such, at which plaintiff 
was represented by substitute counsel, Phil L. Hansen, the matter 
was again submitted for decision and a pretrial conference was 
scheduled for November 14, 1988. 
Being now fully advised, the court sets forth its 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Memorandum Decision and Order. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
For purposes of this Motion, defendants have stipulated 
that the factual allegations in plaintiffs complaint may be 
taken as true. With this in mind, the court here reiterates the 
essential allegations set forth in plaintiff's complaint. 
On April 2, 1986, plaintiff began her employment with 
Emery Mining as a security specialist, and continued her 
employment uninterrupted after April 27, 1986, when UP&L assumed 
operations of Emery Mining. Plaintiff alleges that shortly after 
commencing her employment, her immediate supervisor, defendant 
Rajski, began a course of sexual discrimination and harassment of 
plaintiff consisting of unwelcome sexual advances and actual 
sexual contact. This included calling her at home, ordering her 
to drive with him to remote rural areas, and detaining her 
against her will. Plaintiff claims that despite her repeated 
rejection of the harassment complained of, such conduct was made 
a condition of her employment, creating an intimidating and 
hostile working environment. On October 10, 1986, plaintiff 
alleges that Rajski called her into his office, detained her, and 
coerced her into signing a "settlement and release," purporting 
to release UP&L, its officers and employees from claims of 
discrimination and civil rights violations. Plaintiff alleges 
that she was then terminated without cause from her employment 
2 
with UP&L on October 10, 1986. Rajski's actions allegedly were 
performed both in his individual capacity and in his capacity as 
an agent for his employers, Emery Mining and UP&L. 
Count I of plaintiff's complaint involves a claim 
against all defendants for sexual discrimination and harassment 
in violation of plaintiff's rights under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 200e-l to -16.1 Counts II 
through X of plaintiff's complaint involve claims arising under 
As a prerequisite to suit under Title VII, timely charges 
must be filed with both the state agency and with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). 42 U.S.C. § 2003-5(3). 
Procedurally, Title VII sets up a process by which the state may 
establish an agency, referred to as a Section 706 Agency, to 
process charges of discrimination alleged to violate Title VII. 
If such an agency exists, the complainant must file the charge with 
that agency before filing the charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5(c). In Utah, the established agency is the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Division, which in turn files the charge with the 
EEOC. The claimant, including one who charges a violation of Title 
VII, has the election of keeping jurisdiction of the case within 
the Division and seeking settlement or formal hearing through the 
Division as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1 (1953 & Supp. 
1987), or requesting the Division to waive its jurisdiction, cease 
administrative processing and forward the case to the EEOC for 
issuance of a right to sue letter. In order to file a civil action 
under Title VII, the charging party must receive or at least be 
entitled to receive such a right to sue letter. 
In this case, plaintiff complied with all procedural 
requirements. Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination 
complaining of sexual harassment with the Utah Antidiscrimination 
Division on April 7, 1987. In response to a written request from 
plaintiff's attorney, the Division wrote plaintiff a letter, dated 
April 19, 1987, agreeing not to exercise jurisdiction, to refer the 
charge to the EEOC, and to take no further action. Then, on April 
19, 1987, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter, after which all 
administrative processing of the charge terminated. 
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Utah state law over which this courts jurisdiction is pendent,2 
Defendants have moved for dismissal of the state law 
claims on the ground that the administrative procedures of the 
Utah Antidiscrimination Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-35-1 to -8 
(1953 & Supp. 1987), ("the Act")3 purportedly afford the 
2
 Specifically, plaintiff's state law claims include: breach 
of employment contract (Count II), bad faith discharge or breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count III) , 
tortious discharge for violation of public policy (Count IV) , 
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count 
V) , invasion of privacy (Count VI) , assault and battery (Count 
VII), false imprisonment (Count VIII), failure to adequately train, 
supervise or control (Count IX) , and fraud and deceit (Count X) . 
For purposes of this Motion, the court assumes that these claims 
are asserted against all defendants despite the fact that 
plaintiff's complaint does not delineate whether each of these 
claims is asserted against all or only some defendants. However, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the contractual claims do not lie 
against Rajski because, as an employee himself, he had no contract 
with plaintiff. Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that the 
claim for failure to adequately train, supervise or control is 
applicable only to Emery Mining and UP&L, as employers. It is also 
logical to conclude that plaintiff is not claiming bad faith 
discharge or tortious discharge for violation of public policy 
against Emery Mining because she was only employed by Emery from 
April 2, 1986 to April 27, 1986, when she became employed by UP&L. 
Also, the claim for fraud and deceit reasonably does not lie 
against Emery as it arises out of the execution and signing of the 
release agreement, which occurred more than five months after UP&L 
assumed operations. Likewise, the circumstances giving rise to 
the claim for false imprisonment occurred after plaintiff was no 
longer employed by Emery. 
3
 The Act contains comprehensive administrative procedures to 
investigate and adjudicate alleged acts of employment 
discrimination based on race, sex, age, religion, national origin, 
or handicap. Initially, an aggrieved party files a charge of 
discrimination with the Utah Antidiscrimination Division of the 
Industrial Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(1) (1953 & Supp. 
1987) . The Commission gives the respondent notice of the charges 
and allows the respondent to respond within ten days. Id. § 34-
35-7.1(3). The Commission assigns an investigator to look into the 
4 
exclusive remedy for all tort and contract claims rooted in 
allegations of sexual discrimination and harassment under Utah 
law. In analyzing this claim, the scope and reach of the Utah 
charge who, after first attempting to effectuate a settlement, 
conducts an investigation of the allegations. Id. If the 
investigator uncovers insufficient evidence supporting the charge, 
he reports this to the Commission, which may then issue a "no 
cause" finding. Id. § 34-35-7.1(4). The charging party may appeal 
the "no cause" finding within 15 days, and request a formal .hearing 
before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). If the Commission 
determines that the matter shall be heard, notice of the hearing 
is given to all parties. Id. If the Commission decides against 
a formal hearing, the claimant may then file a complaint in state 
district court to have the matter heard de novo. On the other 
hand, if the investigator uncovers sufficient evidence to support 
the charge, the Commission may then issue a "cause" finding. The 
Commission, as a further means of effectuating a settlement, may 
then request the parties to conduct conciliation discussions. Id. 
§ 34-35-7.1(5). If that effort fails or the respondent declines 
to participate, the respondent may appeal the "cause" finding 
within 15 days, and request a formal hearing before an ALJ. If the 
Commission decides against conducting a formal hearing, the 
respondent may then petition the district court to hear the matter 
de novo. Id. After the hearing, the ALJ will issue proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and a proposed order to the 
Commission. Id. § 34-35-7.1(12). The Commission may adopt, 
reverse or modify the proposed Order, and if there has been a 
violation of the Act, the Commission shall issue a "cease and 
desist" order to the respondent and may order, among other things, 
hiring, reinstatement, promotion, back pay, and the reimbursement 
of costs and attorney's fees. Id. Either party has a right to 
judicial review of the Commission's final order, which the district 
court must hear de novo. Xd. § 34-35-8. These procedures provide 
the exclusive remedy under Utah law for employment discrimination 
based on race, color, sex, age, religion, national origin, or 
handicap. Id. § 34-35-7.1(15). It should be noted that minor 
changes have been made to the Act by way of amendment. However, 
because the acts complained of here occurred prior to the effective 
date of the amendment, January 1, 1988, and because statutes 
generally are not given retrospective operation, see United States 
v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70,79 (1982), the court will not 
apply the 1988 amended version of the Act. 
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statute will be discussed in the light of each of the asserted 
pendent claims. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Scope of Utah Statute 
The Utah Antidiscrimination Act proscribes conduct 
defined to be a "discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice." Among other things, the Act provides that it is a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice, 
[f]or an employer to refuse to hire, or 
promote, or to discharge, demote, terminate 
any person, or to retaliate against, or 
discriminate in matters of compensation or in 
terms, privileges, and conditions of 
employment against any person otherwise 
qualified, because of race, color, sex, age 
if the individual is 40 years of age or 
older, religion, national origin, or 
handicap. . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6(1)(a)(i) (1953 & Supp. 1987). 
This language has been administratively interpreted to 
include discrimination by means of sexual harassment.4 Under 
Utah Antidiscrimination Division Regulation R486-l-l(g) 
(1985). The Utah regulations turn to the guidelines promulgated 
by the EEOC to define "sexual harassment": 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors,and other verbal or physical conduct of 
a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment 
when (1) submission to such conduct is made 
either explicitly or implicitly a term or 
condition of an individual's employment, (2) 
submission to or rejection of such conduct by 
an individual is used as the basis for 
employment decisions affecting such individual, 
or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect 
of unreasonably interfering with an 
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federal law, which provides guidance in interpretation of the 
Utah statute,5 sexual harassment constitutes sexual 
discrimination6 and may come in the form of sexual advances or 
stereotyped and demeaning comments.7 This court takes the view 
individualfs work performance or creating an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working 
environment. 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) 1988. Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(14) 
authorizes the promulgation of regulations "to govern, expedite, 
and effectuate" the procedures under the Act. 
Where state law interpretation of the Act is nonexistent 
the Division's regulations expressly look to Federal law for 
guidance. Utah Antidiscrimination Division Regulation R486-1-3 
(1985). 
Federal courts have held that sexual harassment constitutes 
sexual discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. E.g. , 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, —U.S.—, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2404-07 
(1986); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th Cir. 
1987); Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 755 
F.2d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 1985); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 
897, 901 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundv v. Jackson. 641 F.2d 934, 943-46 
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 994 (D.C. Cir. 
1977); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc.. 552 F.2d 1032 (4th 
Cir. 1977); Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc.. 639 F.Supp. 1199, 
1203 (D. Utah 1986). 
7
 E.g~, Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.r 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th 
Cir. 1987); Bundv v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
It may also take the form of sexual consideration as a quid pro quo 
for job benefits. E.g., Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1413; Jones v. Flagship 
Int'l. 793 F.2d 714, 721-22 (5th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 
1065 (1987); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 (11th Cir. 
1982). Additionally, an employee's termination, denial of 
promotion, failure to hire, or other "concrete" adverse employment 
decisions can form the basis of Title VII liability if such 
decision results from the employee's refusal of a sexual advance. 
Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 
599, 603 (7th Cir. 1985); Henson, 682 F.2d at 908; Craig v. Y & Y 
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that employer liability for sexual harassment is governed by 
ordinary agency rules.8 
Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80 (3d Cir. 1983); Miller v. Bank of 
Am. , 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979); Garber v. Saxon Business 
Prods. , 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977). Moreover, because Title VII 
prohibits sex discrimination with respect to an employee's "terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), 
several courts have concluded that sexual harassment alone, even 
absent a tangible job detriment, violates Title VII. See Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson, —U.S.—, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2404 (1986), 
Henson, 682 F.2d at 901; Bundv, 641 F.2d at 943-46. Bowen v. 
Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 639 F.Supp. 1199, 1203 n.*8 (D. Utah 
1986) (where alleged injury is hostile environment, sexual 
harassment itself may be regarded as offensive per se and violative 
of Title VII). In Vinson, 106 S.Ct. 2399, the Supreme Court noted 
that both the language of Title VII, which is not limited to 
economic discrimination, and the EEOC guidelines show that Title 
VII claims are not limited to economic injury. 106 S.Ct. at 2404-
05. The Court also stated that as to the defense that plaintiff 
voluntarily entered into the sexual relationship, the proper 
question for the District Court was not whether the sexual 
relations were voluntary but whether the alleged sexual advances 
were "unwelcome." 106 S.Ct. at 2406. 
* Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1417-18 (10th 
Cir. 1987). In Hicks, the Tenth Circuit rejected lack of actual 
notice as an absolute defense to employer liability for sexual 
harassment. Id. at 1418. Rather, relying upon the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 219(2) (1958), the court held that an employer 
could be held liable for sexual harassment by a supervisor if the 
employer were negligent or reckless, and the supervisor purported 
to act or to speak on behalf of the employer or was aided in 
accomplishing the sexual harassment by the existence of the agency 
relation. Id. 
Federal courts have taken various approaches to employer 
liability for the acts of their employees in sexually harassing 
other employees. One approach adopts a rule of strict liability 
relieving the plaintiff from the burden of demonstrating that 
higher management knew or should have known, or otherwise 
acquiesced, in the sexual harassment. This approach emphasizes the 
EEOC guidelines which would impose licibility "where the employer 
(or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known 
of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and 
appropriate corrective action." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1988). 
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B. Exclusivity of Remedy Under Utah Law 
Defendants contend that all of plaintiff's pendent 
claims are preempted by the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(15) (1953 & Supp. 1987), which 
provides: "The procedures contained in this section and Section 
34-35-8 are the exclusive remedy under state law for employment 
discrimination because of race, color, sex, age, religion, nation 
[national] origin, or handicap." 
Under the guidelines, an employer may even be liable for sexual 
harassment by nonemployees in its work place under some conditions, 
depending upon its degree of control over such nonemployees or 
legal responsibility for their acts. Id. § 1604.11(e). See Horn, 
755 F.2d at 606; Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th 
Cir. 1979); see also Bundy, 641 F.2d at 943 (suggesting such a 
standard by citing the EEOC guidelines and holding that an employer 
is liable for discriminatory acts by a supervisor); Robson v. Eva's 
Supermarket, Inc., 538 F.Supp. 857, 863 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (employer 
liable for supervisor's acquiescence in sexual harassment of 
plaintiff by fellow employee). 
A second approach adopting a narrower scope of employer 
liability requires actual or constructive knowledge by the employer 
if there has been no adverse employment consequence or if the 
harassment was instigated by a fellow employee rather than by a 
supervisor. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 910; Barrett v. Omaha Natfl 
Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 428 (8th Cir. 1984); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 
251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983). In Vinson, 106 S.Ct. 2399, the Supreme 
Court found that the court of appeals erred in finding that 
employers were always strictly liable, but it held that the record 
was not complete enough to justify a definitive ruling. 106 S.Ct. 
at 2408. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens wrote 
separately in Vinson to stress that they would extend the rule 
applied in other Title VII cases, and hold that sexual harassment 
by supervisory personnel, leading to a hostile work environment, 
should be imputed to the employer for Title VII purposes. Id. at 
2411. 
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Plaintiff argues that the Act fails to provide victims 
of "discriminatory or prohibited employment practice[s]If with an 
adequate avenue of relief. In that regard, the Act provides that 
following a hearing, if the administrative law judge ("ALT") 
finds that there has been a violation of the Act he or she shall 
issue, 
an order requiring the respondent to cease 
and desist from the unlawful discrimination 
or prohibited employment practice and to take 
such affirmative action, including, but not 
limited to. hiring, reinstatement, or 
upgrading of employees, with or without 
backpay, the referring of applicants for 
employment by any respondent labor 
organization, the admission to or 
continuation in enrollment in an 
apprenticeship program, on-the-job training 
program, or a vocational school, the posting 
of notices, and making of reports as to the 
manner of compliance, and the reimbursement 
of costs and attorney's fees as in the 
judgment of the commission effectuate the 
purposes of this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(12) (1953 & Supp. 1987) (emphasis 
added). Although the language "including, but not limited" may 
be taken to suggest that the ALJ has authority to remedy all tort 
and contract violations by any means he or she so desires, a more 
reasonable interpretation of this provision is that the ALJ may 
only award equitable relief that is of the same general nature as 
the remedies explicitly provided for in the Act such as 
injunctive relief, reinstatement and back pay. 
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Defendants argue that the Act provides an adequate 
remedy for all of plaintiffs grievances because any person 
"claiming to be aggrieved by a final order of the [industrial] 
commission" may commence an action for trial de novo in state 
district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-8(3).9 Even if this 
court accepted that argument, victims of intentional torts would 
still have the additional burden of first pursuing administrative 
remedies before obtaining adequate redress for wrongs 
traditionally remedied within the judicial system. An additional 
concern is that there is no right to a jury trial at such a trial 
de novo in the state district court. Beehive Medical 
Electronics, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 583 P.2d 53, 57 
(Utah 1978).10 Furthermore, if this court were to hold that the 
In University of Utah v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 736 
P.2d 630 (Utah 1987), the plaintiff prevailed before an ALJ on her 
claims of age discrimination and retaliation. The industrial 
commission adopted the findings, conclusions and recommendations 
of the ALJ. The defendant sought de novo judicial review in the 
district court pursuant to section 34-35-8. Following a proceeding 
in which the district court reviewed the record created at the 
hearing before the ALJ and at which the district judge heard 
additional testimony, the district court set aside the order of the 
commission. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the proper 
procedure under the statute was a wholly de novo proceeding, and 
that the district court was not required to accord deference to the 
commission's factual findings or legal conclusions. Id. at 633. 
In Beehive Medical Electronics, the court reasoned that 
because section 34-35-8(6) provides that the "District Court shall 
enter its findings of fact in such cases, the Legislature clearly 
intended that the court, not a jury, be the fact finder in 
antidiscrimination cases . . . " 583 P.2d at 57. 
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Act preempts plaintiff's intentional tort claims, then the Act's 
180 day statute of limitations found in section 34-35-7,1(1) 
would also apply to those claims, as to which plaintiff would 
otherwise be entitled to at least a one year limitation 
period.11 
This court reads the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Act as only foreclosing those common law causes of action which 
are based upon the very conduct which is necessary to prove 
sexual harassment or sex discrimination unde>r the Act, namely, 
conduct expressly prohibited by the Act or conduct satisfying all 
the essential elements of a prima facie case.12 Where the 
The claims for assault, battery, and false imprisonment 
have a one year statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
29(4), and the claim for fraud and deceit has a three year statute 
of limitations, jld. § 78-12-26(3). However, the limitation period 
with respect to the claims for intentional and negligent infliction 
of emotional distress and invasion of privacy are not clearly 
established. Section 78-12-25(3) provides a four year limitation 
of actions for n[a]n action for relief not otherwise provided for 
by law." There is no reason to believe that these causes of action 
should not be subject to the four year statute. However, this 
court declines to make a definitive ruling because resolution of 
this issue is more appropriately left to the Utah Supreme Court. 
This court has previously set forth the following elements 
to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment under Title 
VII: "(1) the employee is a member of a protected group; (2) the 
employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the 
harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege 
of employment (quid pro quo or created a hostile environment); and 
(4) the employer is subject to liability based on agency 
principles." Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc., 639 F.Supp. 1199, 
1204 (D. Utah 1986) (citing Henson v.^  City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 
903-05 (11th Cir. 1982); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. 
2399, 2405 (1986)). There is no reason why the same elements of 
proof should not apply to a claim of sexual harassment under the 
12 
allegations in plaintiff's complaint demonstrate that plaintiff 
has suffered a different injury than the statute covers, an 
independent cause of action exists outside the Act. 
Consequently, the alleged causes of action will be treated 
seriatim to determine whether they are preempted by the Act. 
1. Breach of Employment Contract 
Plaintiff's claim for breach of employment contract 
essentially is a claim for alleged wrongful termination grounded 
in sexual discrimination. The Utah Act expressly prohibits an 
employer from terminating any person because of sex or 
discriminating against an employee "in terms, privileges, and 
conditions of employment." Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6(1)(a)(i). 
Because the breach of employment contract claim is based upon the 
very discriminatory behavior prohibited by the Act, this court 
concludes that the Utah Act preempts this cause of action. 
As an alternative ground for granting defendants7 
motion as to this claim, under Utah law as an "at will" employee, 
Utah Act. The first element may be established by a simple 
stipulation of the employee's gender. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903; 
Valley Camp. 639 F.Supp. at 1205. As to the second element, 
unwelcome conduct is behavior which the employee did not solicit 
or promote and the employee considered as undesirable or offensive-
Henson, 682 F.2d at 903. The third element may be proved by 
demonstrating either a concrete adverse employment decision, or a 
hostile or utterly unpleasant work environment for members of one 
sex. See Vinson, 106 S.Ct. at 2406-08. Finally, satisfying the 
fourth element requires application of general respondeat superior 
principles. 
13 
plaintiff has no right of action for breach of employment 
contract. See Bruno v. Plateau Mining Co., 747 P.2d 1055, 1057-
58 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Rose v. Allied Dev. Co., 719 P.2d 83, 
84-85 (Utah 1986); Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 
1979) .13 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to the 
general "at will" doctrine: 
[I]n the absence of some further express or 
implied stipulation as to the duration of the 
employment or of a good consideration in 
addition to the services contracted to be 
rendered, the contract is no more than an 
indefinite general hiring which is terminable 
at the will of either party. 
Bihlmaier. 603 P.2d at 792 (footnote omitted and emphasis added). 
Plaintiff does not assert that she was employed pursuant to a 
formal employment contract. Instead, she asserts breach of an 
implied contract as evidenced by the Emery Mining employee 
handbook. Such an implied-in-fact contract, however, would require 
conduct evidencing both parties1 mutual assent to be obligated by 
the certain terms of their bargain. Bruno, 747 P.2d at 1058 
(citing Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah 1976)). Here, 
plaintiff neither negotiated with respect to the contents of the 
manual, nor read or received the manual until after she was 
employed. Unless an employee manual contains "specific contractual 
terms" evidencing contractual intent, it is not transformed into 
an employment contract for a definite term. See Zaccardi v. Zale 
Corp., 856 F.2d 1473, 1477 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying New Mexico 
law); Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.. 754 F.2d 884, 886 (10th 
Cir. 1985). See also Garcia v. Aetna Finance Co., 752 F.2d 488, 
490-91 (10th Cir. 1984) (employment manual containing termination 
and performance appraisal policies did not create a contract for 
a definite term); Williams v. West Jordan City, 714 F.2d 1017, 
1019-20 (10th Cir. 1983) (neither city-wide personnel manual nor 
police department manual created property interests by means of an 
implied contract under Utah law). Here, plaintiff relies upon the 
handbook for what it says generally about compliance with 
antidiscrimination laws rather than as a source of any commitment 
to the duration of her employment. To satisfy the second Bihlmaier 
exception, the employee "would have had to offer [his employer], 
at its request, something more than what he was already obligated 
14 
2. Bad Faith Discharge or Breach of the Implied 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Plaintiff's claim for bad faith discharge or breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith is grounded principally upon 
the same factual allegations as her breach of contract claim. 
Since this claim is based upon the very discriminatory conduct 
prohibited by the Act, it too is preempted by Act. 
As an alternative ground for granting defendants7 
motion as to this claim, the court notes that Utah does not 
recognize an action for breach of an implied duty of good faith 
where, as here, the employment is terminable at will. See Rose 
v. Allied Dev. Co., 719 P.2d at 86.; Amos v. Corporation of 
Presiding Bishop, 594 F.Supp. 791, 829-30 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd 
in part on other grounds, —U.S.—, 107 S.Ct. 2862 (1987). 
3. Tortious Discharge for Violation of Public Policy 
Plaintiff asks this court to follow the trend of other 
courts that have determined that an exception to the at will 
doctrine should be made so as to create a remedy in tort where 
the reason for the termination of the employee violates a broader 
to do under his employment agreement, not just a continuation of 
the duties he was required to perform." Rose, 719 P.2d at 86. 
See also Bruno, 747 P.2d at 1058. Because there is no allegation 
here of consideration, beyond those services which were already 
being performed, plaintiff cannot establish the second Bihlmaier 
exception. 
15 
social and public policy.14 Specifically, plaintiff asserts that 
See e.g., Stewart v. Travelers Corp,, 503 F.2d 108 (9th 
Cir. 1974) (discharged because wages had been garnished where 
federal statute made such discharge criminal); McNultv v. Borden, 
Inc., 474 F.Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (discharged for opposition 
to employer's price-fixing scheme); Rulon-Miller v. International 
Business Machines, Inc., 162 Cal.App.3d 241, 208 Cal.Rptr. 524 
(1984) (discharged for romantic involvement with employee of 
competitor); Delanev v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 
114 (1984) (discharged for refusal to sign false and potentially 
defamatory statement); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal.App.3d 
443, 168 Cal.Rptr. 722 (1980) (discharged for refusal to help 
market a drug that employee believed to be hazardous); Brown v. 
Transcon, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978) (discharged for filing 
workers1 compensation claim); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 
512 (1975) (discharged for performing jury duty); Monge v. Beebe 
Rubber Co. . 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (discharged for 
refusing to go out with supervisor); Frampton v. Central Indiana 
Gas Co. . 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (discharged for filing 
worker's compensation claim); Petermann v. International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal.App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) 
(discharged for refusal to commit perjury). But cf. Amos v. 
Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 594 F.Supp. 791, 829-30 (D. Utah 
1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, —U.S. — , 107 S.Ct. 2862 
(1987) (refusing to recognize cause of action for wrongful 
discharge of at will employee in violation of public policy against 
religious discrimination); Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F.Supp. 27 
(D. Mass. 1984) (refusing to recognize cause of action for 
discharge in violation of public policy against age 
discrimination); Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F.Supp. 
242 (N.D. 111. 1983) (discharge of at will employee who had 
retained attorney in dispute with employer regarding payment of 
wages did not violate public policy, since employee had no standing 
to assert rights he claimed); Borsen v. Rohm & Haas, Inc., 526 
F.Supp. 1230 (E.D. Pa. 1981), afffd, 729 F.2d 1445 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(employer's attempts to rid itself of troublesome employee together 
with its failure to follow its own evaluation policies did not 
constitute wrongful discharge in violation of public policy); 
Shaitelman v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 517 F.Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980) (group insurance salesmen who were discharged for refusal to 
relinquish accrued right to be paid for credits earned and 
accumulated during employment failed to state claim for wrongful 
discharge based on public policy); McClunev v. Joseph Schlitz 
Brewing Co. , 489 F.Supp. 24 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (refusing to recognize 
cause of action for bad faith discharge or discharge in violation 
of public policy against sex discrimination); Wehr v. Burroughs 
Corp., 438 F.Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (no cause of action for 
16 
she should be allowed recovery in tort because her discharge 
allegedly was based on sex discrimination, unfair labor practices 
and criminal conduct, all of which violate fundamental public 
policies of the State of Utah. However, the Utah Supreme Court 
has not adopted such a public policy exception, and this court 
declines to predict whether it will do so. 
4. Intentional or Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress 
Plaintiff's assertions of intentional or negligent 
infliction of emotional distress go beyond the discriminatory 
conduct prohibited by the Utah Act. As pleaded, the alleged 
conduct15 constitutes "outrageous behavior"16 for which the Utah 
violation of public policy against age discrimination or for breach 
of implied contract). 
Plaintiff alleges that Rajski required her "to remain 
seated in a confined room for lengthy periods of time while he 
verbally and emotionally abused and threatened her." Complaint, 
C-87-0659G, at 5 56. Plaintiff additionally alleges that 
" [defendants1 conduct was willful, malicious, and oppressive and 
intentionally . . . caused severe emotional distress and physical 
pain and suffering to plaintiff through intolerable and outrageous 
conduct." Id. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment d, in 
pertinent part states: 
Liability has been found only where the conduct 
has been so outrageous in character, and so 
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible 
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a 
civilized community. Generally, the case is 
one in which the recitation of the facts to an 
average member of the community would arouse 
17 
Supreme Court recognizes a cause of action, which may be based 
upon either intentional17 or negligent conduct.18 
5. Invasion of Privacy 
Assuming this cause of action exists in Utah, it is not 
preempted by the Utah Act because it does not constitute the very 
discriminatory behavior prohibited by the Act. Such a tort, 
however, has not yet been judicially recognized in Utah. 
Nevertheless, given the fact that "rights of privacy are . 
recognized in virtually all jurisdictions," W. PROSSER & W. 
KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 851 (5th ed. 1984), there is 
no reason to assume that the Utah Supreme Court would not 
his resentment against the actor, and lead him 
to exclaim, "Outrageous!" 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that a cause of 
action for emotional distress may be based upon intentional 
conduct. Sperber v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah 
1987). Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344, 346 (1961). 
At the time this matter was argued, defendants asserted 
that Utah does not recognize a cause of action for emotional 
distress may not be based upon mere negligence, citing Reiser v. 
Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 100 (Utah 1982) and Scimms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 
2d 289, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47 (1961)). Since that time, however, 
the Utah Supreme Court has departed from the approach taken in 
Reiser and Samms, and expressly recognized that "a cause of action 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress may be maintained" 
in Utah. Johnson v. Rogers, 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Utah August 
25, 1988). Although the Court overviewed the various analytical 
approaches for implementing such a cause of action, it declined to 
adopt a definitive legal standard by which the tort is to be 
defined. See id. at 13 (Zimmerman, J. concurring). 
18 
recognize a cause of action for invasion of privacy if presented 
with an appropriate factual situation. It is clear that the 
essential elements19 of this tort are separate and distinct from 
the elements of proof for a claim of sexual harassment under the 
Utah Act. Accordingly, such is not preempted by the Utah Act. 
In the case at bar, plaintiff alleges that Rajski 
repeatedly called her at home, followed her during off-work 
hours, appeared uninvited at her home, and delivered sexually 
suggestive notes and clothing to her. It is sufficient for 
purposes of this Motion to find that such allegations could be a 
violation of plaintiff's right of privacy, constituting a tort 
for which she may recover damages to the extent that it can be 
proved. 
6. Assault and Battery 
In support of her claim for assault and battery, 
The tort of privacy as it has developed includes protection 
of an individual's personality as well as protection of solitude. 
In all, the tort includes the following four kinds of wrongs: (1) 
appropriation by defendant of plaintiff's picture or name for 
defendant's commercial advantage; (2) intrusion by defendant upon 
plaintiff's affairs or seclusion; (3) publication by defendant of 
facts which place the plaintiff in a false light; and (4) public 
disclosure of private facts about plaintiff by defendant. W. 
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra. at § 117. The type of invasion of 
privacy applicable to this case falls within the intrusion 
category, a tort which the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B 
articulates as follows: "One who intentionally intrudes, 
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another 
or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the 
other for intrusion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person." 
19 
plaintiff alleges that on numerous occasions Rajski intended to, 
and did touch her body in an offensive manner without her 
consent, and that as a result, she suffered both physical and 
emotional injuries. Complaint, C-87-0659G, at 55 64, 67. One 
« . • t 2 0 • 
can be subject to liability to another for assault if: "(a) he 
acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the 
person of the other or a third person, or an imminent 
apprehension of such a contact, and (b) the other is thereby put 
in such imminent apprehension." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
21. A person can be subject to liability for battery21 if: the 
requirements of (a) above are met, and "(b) a harmful contact 
with the person of the other directly or indirectly results." 
Id. at § 13; see also Morgan v. Pistone, 25 Utah 2d 63, 475 P.2d 
839 (1970). Because the elements of proof for both of these 
torts differ dramatically from the elements for a claim of sexual 
harassment under the Act, the court finds that the Act does not 
preempt these causes of action. 
7. False Imprisonment 
Assault is a tort which protects a plaintiff's "interest 
in freedom from apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with 
the person . . . " W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra, § 10 at 43. 
Battery is the "interest in freedom from intentional and 
unpermitted contacts with the plaintiff's person ..." w. PROSSER 
& W. KEETON, supra, § 9 at 39. 
20 
Under Utah law, the tort of false imprisonment is 
defined as a nonconsensual, intentional detention or restraint of 
another person. State v. Pass, 30 Utah 2d 197, 515 P.2d 612, 613 
(1973); Mildon v. Bvbee. 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458, 459 
(1962); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 35; W. PROSSER & 
W. KEETON, supra, § 11. A person may be falsely imprisoned "by 
actual imprisonment, or by interference or restraint upon his 
freedom of movement imposed by force or threats." Pass, -515 P.2d 
at 612. It is abundantly clear that the Act does not preempt 
this cause of action because the theoretical basis for the two 
claims are separate and distinct. 
8. Failure to Adequately Train, Supervise or Control 
The essence of this alleged cause of action is that 
In support of her false imprisonment claim, plaintiff 
alleges that: 
69. Rajski, on October 10, 1986, intended 
to, and did cause a false imprisonment or 
unlawful detention of Plaintiff by his 
detention or restraint of Plaintiff's person 
in an unlawful manner, against her will and 
without her consent. 
70. Additionally, on [sic] or about July 
15, 1986, Rajski intended to, and did cause a 
false imprisonment or unlawful detention of 
Plaintiff by his detention or restraint of 
Plaintiff in confined quarters during late 
night hours, while he subjected Plaintiff to 
lengthy verbal and emotional assaults, all in 
an unlawful manner against Plaintiff's will and 
without her consent. 
Complaint, C-87-0659G, at 55 69, 70. 
21 
employers have an obligation to provide a reasonable amount of 
training to employees so as to allow them to carry out their 
duties without endangering themselves, fellow workers, or third 
persons. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213. With respect 
to this claim, plaintiff complains primarily that Emery Mining 
and Up&L failed adequately to train and supervise Rajski as to 
nondiscrimination on the basis of sex, and additionally as to the 
unlawful and prohibited practice of sexual harassment. Despite 
the lack of Utah law to give the court guidance on this theory, 
the court believes that general negligence concepts should apply. 
See 4d# Because failure to supervise may encompass more than 
acts defined to be "discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practices" under the Utah Act, the court concludes that the Act 
does not preempt this cause of action. 
9. Fraud and Deceit 
As with plaintiff's other intentional tort claims, it 
is evident that her claim for fraud and deceit23 is not preempted 
In order to establish a prima facie case of fraud or deceit 
under Utah law, the following elements must be proven: 
(1) [t]hat a representation was made; 
(2) concerning a presently existing 
material fact; 
(3) which was false; 
(4) which the representor either 
(a) knew to be false, or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he 
had insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representations; 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other 
party to act upon it; 
22 
by the Utah Act. Plaintiff asserts that Rajski and UP&L 
fraudulently induced her to sign a "release" document purporting 
to release UP&L and its officers from liability. The court 
concludes that plaintiff has adequately alleged all essential 
elements for a claims of fraudulent misrepresentation. 
The stipulation of counsel in which even conclusory and 
apparently unsubstantiated allegations were deemed established 
for purposes of this motion requires denial of the corporate 
defendants motion to dismiss as to several causes of action at 
this time.24 
(6) that the other party, acting 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; 
(7) did in fact rely upon it; 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; 
(9) to his injury and damage. 
Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc.. 739 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Pace v. Parrishf 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 
273, 274-75 (1952)); see also Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 
610 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1980); Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 
293, 294 (Utah 1980); Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 
1978) . 
Whether Emery Mining and UP&L would be liable for 
intentional torts allegedly committed by Rajski presents a fact 
bound inquiry. The court notes that in Utah principles of 
respondent superior define the scope of employer liability for the 
intentional torts of its employees. An employer is liable for an 
employee's intentional torts committed during the course of 
employment where either the acts are committed in furtherance of 
the employer's interests, or the employment is such that the use 
of force could be contemplated in its accomplishment. Barney v. 
Jewel Tea Co. , 104 Utah 292, 139 P.2d 878, 879 (1943). An employer 
may be liable for damages resulting from an assault and battery 
committed by an employee, even though not in furtherance of the 
employer's interests, if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the 
employer was negligent in employing or retaining the employee under 
23 
For the reasons set forth herein, the court concludes 
that summary judgment should be granted in favor of defendants as 
to plaintiff's claims for breach of employment contract, bad 
faith discharge, and tortious discharge for violation of public 
policy. Summary judgment is denied as to plciintiff's claims for 
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
invasion of privacy, false imprisonment, assault and battery, and 
fraud and deceit.25 Counsel for defendant Raj ski is directed to 
prepare a form of Order consistent with the memorandum decision 
and order after first complying with Local Rule 13(e). 
circumstances that such assault and battery was reasonably 
foreseeable. Stone v. Hurst Lumber Co., 15 Utah 2d 49, 386 P.2d 
910, 911 (1963). Other than conclusory allegations in her 
complaint that Rajski was an agent of Emery Mining and UP&L, who 
at all relevant times allegedly was acting within the scope of his 
employment, plaintiff has failed to set forth a factual foundation 
to support liability against Emery Mining & UP&L. The court is 
nevertheless satisfied that such allegations can be read as 
assertions that the acts were committed in furtherance of the 
interest of Emery Mining and UP&L. See Barney, 139 P. 2d at 
879.Accordingly, assuming the bare allegations of the complaint as 
true, the motions must be denied at this time. 
UP&L argues in its reply memorandum that plaintiff's claims 
are barred by the workers' compensation provisions of the Utah 
Code. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-45, 60 (1953 & Supp. 1987). 
However, plaintiff did not raise this issue in her opposition 
memorandum. Because Local Rule 5(e) provides that "reply 
memorandum must be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the 
memorandum opposing the motion," the court will not address the 
workers' compensation issue at this time. 
24 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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